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The International Human Rights
Movement Today
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL*

I begin by asking: is there such a thing as an International Human
Rights Movement? I would like to raise that as an issue that we need
to address, whether there is one movement or multiple movements
within the human rights tradition, and whether there are in fact
movements that might be part of the human rights tradition but
nevertheless do not use or rely on the discourse of international
human rights. In other words, diversity and contradiction within the
Human Rights Movement is a theme that I think we need to focus on
and problematize. And we should also start by recognizing that
‗international human rights‘ is a language, a language of both power
and resistance. It is a language of hegemony and counter-hegemony,
and we need to recognize the multiple uses to which it is put and the
fact that it is a terrain of contestation, as I have argued before, for
multiple deployments of both power and resistance.1
I also think we need to start by problematizing the ‗origins‘ of the
International Human Rights Movement. To say that we should talk
about international human rights ―sixty years on‖ is to tie us to a
particular era with a beginning from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and to a privileged type of expertise, especially law,
* Associate Professor of Law and Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
Director, Program on Human Rights and Justice, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1. BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) [hereinafter RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW]; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic International
Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD
WORLD Q. 767 (2006) [hereinafter Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic International Law].
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as the mechanism through which this particular language expresses
itself. Some of the biggest issues in today‘s Human Rights
Movement in fact raise questions both about the political consequences of rights, as well as the nature of the type of expertise that is
deployed in realizing human rights claims.2 So I want to make three
points briefly, and then leave the reader with three questions, which I
think are very important for both scholars and practitioners of human
rights today.
The three points that I want to make are as follows. First, I want to
talk about what I shall call the ―birth defect‖ of the International
Human Rights Movement, as well as the nature of the relationship
between what I will call ‗counter-narratives‘ of human rights and the
official narratives of human rights. By birth defect, I mean both the
well-noted challenge to the official beginnings of the international
human rights regime in terms of its representativity,3 and its being
able to speak on behalf of all. Various scholars and writers have
examined this at length,4 so I will not belabor the point but will
simply note the absence of particular cultures and communities and
viewpoints in the making of international human rights. We need to
recognize and be honest about such absences. The birth defect of
international human rights was never fully cured in a sense, partly
because of the way in which it responded, in my view, to the most
dominant political question of the second half of the 20th century,
which was not the Cold War, but colonialism.5 Colonialism was the
larger story in which the Cold War was, of course, one of the plots.
But colonialism was left in place by human rights, ostensibly the
leading moral discourse of the day.6 The structures of colonialism, as
well as the structures of the economic order that colonialism
supported, were left in place, and international human rights did not
rise up to be the language through which such structures were going

2. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Effect of Rights on Political Culture, in THE
EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo & James Heenan eds., 1999);
David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the
Politics of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT‘L L. 589
(1996).
4. See, e.g., COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); UPENDRA BAXI, THE
FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).
5. RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1; see also ANTONY
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
6. See generally RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1.
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to be challenged.
But I also think that we need to recognize the nature of the
counter-narratives of human rights that arose and pushed back the
official version‘s blind-spots and biases. These counter-narratives of
human rights, as I have argued, should not be seen simply in terms of
a traditional analytical lens of state politics, but instead, through the
theory and practice of social movements.7 Looked at this way, the
origins of international human rights could be extended back further
into the struggles of labor in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the
human rights rebellions of women and slaves, and a range of anticolonial movements.8 The point is simply that you could seek any
number of beginnings of human rights, and those beginnings are, of
course, not part of the official history of ‗international human rights.‘
They are certainly not part of law schools‘ curricula when they teach
international human rights law. It is by now well recognized by
mostly everyone except the narrowest legal experts that the politics of
human rights was and is in many ways generated by a range of social
movements or ordinary people, not only by states and elites. Of
course states played a role in the formal creation of texts, but I think
it is a mistake to focus our attention only on states. These
movements were both local and global at the same time, such as the
African-American movement,9 and not simply global alone. And
they were not particularly law-centric or law focused in any easy or
particular way.10 Recognizing this raises the question in very significant ways of what role law plays in the International Human
Rights Movement. This is a question that many of us are grappling
with at this stage,11 as well as with the consequences of what has been
termed ‗over-legalizing‘ human rights,12 a topic to which I will come.
7. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and the Development Encounter: Violence
and Resistance at the Margins, 93 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 16 (1999); RAJAGOPAL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1.
8. See MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO
THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (2004).
9. See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955 (2003).
10. See e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).
11. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the
Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002); Rajagopal, Counterhegemonic International Law, supra note 1.
12. Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM.
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At this stage, it is striking that many of us are rejecting some of the
easy consensus positions of the past, which are that international
human rights has a monopoly on truth, justice, or resistance, or the
idea that international human rights is a kind of totalizing language of
emancipation. Instead, I want to recognize that languages of emancipation are multiple, and have a contradictory and sometimes uneasy
relationship with what we call ―international human rights.‖ And
further, the successes and failures of what today we call international
human rights are directly the consequence of both its birth defects as
well as the influence of the counter-narratives on the official human
rights discourse, and the way in which the official human rights
discourse has interacted with or ‗received‘ these counter-narratives.
That relationship is a problematic one, and we need to try to
understand the ways in which it is problematic.
The second point I want to make is about the role of Third World
states in international human rights. I think that we can all agree that
international human rights has been, by and large, about Third World
states. And I think that it is fair to say that international human rights
is what it is because of Third World states. I say this in two senses,
both a negative sense as well as a positive sense. The negative sense
is in terms of what Makau Mutua has referred to as a metaphor of
human rights, of ―savages, victims and saviors.‖13 The savages being,
of course, the Third World dictators, the victims being the poor Third
World people, as well as anyone not like us, and, of course, the
saviors being those of us, the heroes in the West, who work to rescue
them. The moral and political implications of this notion need to be
talked about.
The second—positive—way in which international human rights
has been influenced by Third World states is less recognized, that is,
in terms of the way in which many of the most significant advances
in human rights that we take for granted these days arose from the
issues that were put on the global agenda by Third World states.
Particularly, I am thinking of the politics of the U.N. at the Commission on Human Rights in the 1960s and '70s. It was the Third
World states that put the biggest human rights issues on the agenda,
including that of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid, and

L. REV. 1832 (2002).
13. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42
HARV. INT‘L L.J. 201 (2001).
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later economic, social, and cultural rights. In other words, the issues
that actually matter for the bulk of the world‘s population were put on
the human rights agenda by Third World States.14 India‘s role, to
offer an example, in putting racial discrimination against its own
nationals in apartheid South Africa on the U.N. Agenda in 1946 was
a kind of door-opening moment in the international human rights
field. There is also, of course, the historical irony that now India is
often on the opposite side of the fence on human rights at the U.N. on
a number of issues. But to recognize these contradictory positions is
to recognize that today international human rights needs to be
understood through the political economy of state formation in the
Third World. Why is it that these changes have taken place, and how
do these changes relate to internal changes within nation-states? On
this matter, the point I want to leave you with is simply that contrary
to how we imagine the official history of international human rights,
Third World states have played a major role in its making and they
also constitute a principle domain of its deployment. I do not think
this is a sense that is actually taught or problematized in much of
human rights teaching, particularly in law schools.
The third point that I want to make has to do with the fact that
international human rights today is not just a language of resistance,
but it is also a language of power. It is a language of management in
conflict and peace studies, for example. It is even a language of
profit that companies deploy to give themselves brand names. I think
that there are several dangers associated with this repositioning of
human rights. I want to call this the danger of Constitutionalizing
international human rights, with a capital ―C.‖
There are three senses in which I think that international human
rights is getting Constitutionalized.15 One is a kind of global
constitutionalism, in which there is a convergence, both in the
popular-culture sense, as well as in the institutional sense of, for
example, revisions of legal texts and constitutions, and the practice of
constitutional courts converging on what you could call a similar
reading of a dominant script called international human rights. I do
not think that there is something bad in convergence per se, because I

14. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Lipstick on a Caterpillar? Assessing the New U.N.
Human Rights Council Through Historical Reflection, 13 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 7 (2007).
15. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
771 (1997).
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do not have any evidence to show that convergence would be in fact
a bad idea on empirics alone, nor do I have evidence that textual
convergence actually produces convergence in practice. What I am
also worried about is the nature of the backlash that such a convergence would produce, and is producing in a number of areas, which I
think international human rights advocates do not appreciate much.
For example, in U.S. domestic law, you can think about Roe v.
Wade16 as a success or you could think about it as success at a given
moment that produced a backlash in the next two decades, which
ended up in fact problematizing not just the politics of the body or
sexual relations, or the question of women‘s rights, but the whole
structure of women‘s rights in many different ways.17
The second way in which international human rights is getting
Constitutionalized is the way in which it is increasingly being used as
a kind of Archimedean point to judge the effectiveness or the
legitimacy of policies in a range of fields, such as development,
security, humanitarianism, and social policy.18 I think that there are
many problems with this, including the possibility that it could end
up importing the biases of international human rights into many of
those other policy areas.
The third sense in which there is a problem with Constitutionalizing international human rights has to do with the over-legalizing
of human rights, which I think is a danger, while ignoring its moral
and political dimensions. Given the great proliferation of global
norms and courts, there was for many years a systematic sidelining of
local democratic experiments as laboratories of rights. There is now
an urgent need to talk about how to increase the politics of the local
in international human rights, and to figure out how to write this
resistance of the local into international human rights. In my own
work, I have argued that one way in which this could be done is by
engaging the counter-narratives of social movements and their
alternative readings of human rights.19
I want to conclude by saying that in many ways international

16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373 (2007).
18. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-conflict Rebuilding: A
Critical Examination, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1347 (2008).
19. RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1.
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human rights today at sixty is like many people who are sixty years
old. It is recognizing many of its problems: it is a little bit
overweight, and it has ballooned in size, but the very expansion in
size brings about problems. It is time for us to go for a visit to the
doctor. I think there are many issues that arise from the troubled
relationship between international human rights, with its privileged
language of law, and the counter-narratives of social movements and
other actors. I would frame them in the form of three questions and
leave them for exploration and discussion.
First, can we
vernacularize human rights without excessive legalism, particularly
in understandings of resistance? Second, can we legalize without
constitutionalizing human rights, with a capital ―C‖? Particularly,
can we escape past institutional forms that would reproduce past
patterns of power and domination? And third, can we critique
legalism itself without surrendering to symbolism in some ways, for
example, of soft-law standards in corporate codes? In other words, is
there perhaps a downside to giving up on the law too much? These
are questions with which many of us grapple, both in terms of our
activist orientations, as well as in scholarly engagement.

